

Indicators of Attack Failure: Debugging and Improving Optimization of Adversarial Examples

Maura Pintor, Luca Demetrio, Angelo Sotgiu, Giovanni Manca, Ambra Demontis, Nicholas Carlini, Battista Biggio, Fabio Roli

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
Adversarial Robustness Evaluation

Goal:

- Find adversarial examples with a given perturbation budget
- Evaluate the robust accuracy

Problems:

- We have to rely on empirical evaluations
- Attacks often fail
- False sense of security
- Hard to fix: only guidelines but no practical debugging tools available!



Gradient-based Attacks

- General formalization for untargeted and targeted attacks
- We highlight steps related to common failures

Input : x , the initial point; y_t , the target (true) class label if the attack is targeted (untargeted); n , the number of iterations; α , the learning rate; f , the target model; (x_{lb}, x_{ub}) , the bounds of the input space; Δ , the considered region.

Output : x^* , the solution found by the algorithm



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1  $x_0 \leftarrow \text{init}(x)$ 
2  $\theta \leftarrow \text{approximation}(\theta)$ 
3  $\delta_0 \leftarrow 0$ 
4 for  $i \in [1, n]$  do
5    $\delta' \leftarrow \delta_i + \alpha \nabla_{x_i} L(x_0 + \delta_i, y_t; \theta)$ 
6    $\delta_{i+1} \leftarrow \text{apply\_constraints}(x_0, \delta', \Delta, x_{lb}, x_{ub})$ 
7  $\delta^* \leftarrow \text{best}(\delta_0, \dots, \delta_n)$ 
8 return  $\delta^*$ 
    
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

- ▷ Initialize starting point
- ▷ Approximate model's parameters
- ▷ Initial δ
- ▷ Compute optimizer step
- ▷ Apply constraints
- ▷ Choose best perturbation

Attack failures



Bad implementation (step 7)





Attack is not converging (step 4-5)



Bad local optimum (step 1-2)




Attack is not adaptive (step 2)




Indicators and mitigations


- We formulate 5 quantitative indicators (all in [0, 1])
- Each indicator is related to one or more failure
- We also propose 5 mitigations to apply, based on indicators results



Break point angle
 $1 - |\cos \beta|$
the attack loss is normalized



Increasing loss
Area under the attack loss if increasing



Experiments


Setting:

- We select 4 defenses with reported failures
- We evaluate our indicators
- We apply mitigations



Results:

- Indicators correctly reveal the "false sense of security"
- Patched attacks drop robust accuracy
- Indicators are strongly correlated with attacks performance



k-WinnersTake All






Distillation



Ensemble Diversity



Turning a Weakness into a Strength



Useful links and implementations

- Open source code <https://github.com/pralab/IndicatorsOfAttackFailure>
- Paper available <https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09947>
- Implemented with SecML



Key Takeaways

- Unified framework for gradient-based attacks and categorization of main failures
- Framework for debugging faulty-conducted security evaluations with quantitative indicators and mitigations strategies
- Empirical evaluation on 4 case-studies
- indicators highlight failures
- mitigations improve the robustness evaluation

Future Work

- Integration in benchmarks
- Add more indicators
- Further automatization
- Towards MLSecOps

References

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