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sAifer Lab

Joint lab on Safety and Security of AI



## Reliable Evaluation and Benchmarking of Machine Learning Models for Real-World Deployments

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# Attacks Against AI are Pervasive!



Sharif et al., *Accessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition*, ACM CCS 2016




Eykholt et al., *Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification*, CVPR 2018



"without the dataset the article is useless"

"okay google browse to evil dot com"

Carlini and Wagner, *Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text*, DLS 2018 [https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio\\_adversarial\\_examples/](https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio_adversarial_examples/)




A. Zou et al., *Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models*, 2023 <https://llm-attacks.org>



# Why ML Can Be Fooled

- ML captures **statistical** correlations between the input data and the desired outputs
- ML models don't achieve true comprehension of the semantics
- They may fail in unexpected ways when patterns change
- Small, carefully designed (adversarial) changes can mislead it



# Wild Patterns: Attacks against Machine Learning

		Attacker's Goal		
		Misclassifications that do not compromise normal system operation	Misclassifications that compromise normal system operation	Querying strategies that reveal confidential information on the learning model or its users
Attacker's Capability	Integrity	Availability	Privacy / Confidentiality	
	Test data	Evasion / adversarial examples	Sponge Attacks	Model extraction / stealing Model inversion Membership inference
	Training data	Backdoor/Targeted poisoning (to allow subsequent intrusions)	Indiscriminate (DoS) poisoning  Sponge Poisoning	Training data poisoning to facilitate privacy leaks at test time

**Attacker's Knowledge:** white-box / black-box (query/transfer) attacks (*transferability* with surrogate models)

Biggio et al., *Poisoning attacks against SVMs*, ICML 2012 - **2022 ICML Test of Time Award**  
 Biggio et al., *Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time*, ECML-PKDD 2013  
 Biggio and Roli, *Wild Patterns*, Patt. Rec. 2018, **Best paper award and PR medal 2021**  
 Cinà, Grosse et al., *Wild Patterns Reloaded*, ACM Comp. Surveys, 2023


# Evasion Attacks a.k.a. Adversarial Examples

Biggio et al. (2013) and Szegedy et al. (2014) independently developed gradient-based attacks against DNNs



An image with barely altered pixels (statistical changes) ...

... that a human still sees as a schoolbus (semantics)...

... but an ML model sees as an ostrich




# Evasion Attacks




$$\min_{\mathbf{w}} \text{training loss } L(D; \mathbf{w})$$



# Evasion Attacks



# Evasion Attacks









# Evasion Attacks

**Exhaustive search** → not possible for modern deep learning models

**Empirical evaluation** → attack = **optimization problem + solving algorithm**

$$\begin{aligned} \delta^* \in \arg \min_{\delta} \quad & \mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y, \theta) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\delta\|_p \leq \epsilon \\ & x_{\text{lb}} \preceq x + \delta \preceq x_{\text{ub}} \end{aligned}$$

Optimize model's confidence on bad decision   
keeping perturbation small   
and respecting feature space constraints 



# Projected Gradient Descent

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**Algorithm 1** Projected Gradient Descent Attack


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**Require:**  $\mathbf{x}$ , the input sample;  $t$ , a variable denoting whether the attack is targeted ( $t = +1$ ) or untargeted ( $t = -1$ );  $y$ , the target (true) class label if the attack is targeted (untargeted);  $\alpha$  the step size for the update;  $K$ , the total number of iterations.


**Ensure:** The optimized adversarial example  $\mathbf{x}^*$ .

```
1:  $\mathbf{x}_0 \leftarrow \mathbf{x}$ ,  $\epsilon_0 = 0$ ,  $\delta_0 \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$ ,  $\delta^* \leftarrow \infty$ 
2: for  $k = 1, \dots, K$  do
3:    $\mathbf{g} \leftarrow t \cdot \nabla_{\delta} L(\mathbf{x}_{k-1} + \delta, y, \theta)$  // loss gradient
4:    $\delta_k \leftarrow \delta_{k-1} + \alpha \cdot \mathbf{g} / \|\mathbf{g}\|_2$  // gradient-scaling
5:    $\delta_k \leftarrow \Pi_{\epsilon}(\mathbf{x}_0 + \delta_k) - \mathbf{x}_0$ 
6:    $\delta_k \leftarrow \text{clip}(\mathbf{x}_0 + \delta_k) - \mathbf{x}_0$ 
7:    $\mathbf{x}_k \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_0 + \delta_k$ 
8: end for
9: return  $\mathbf{x}^* \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_0 + \delta^*$ 
```

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# Adversarial Robustness







$$\begin{aligned} \delta^* \in \arg \min_{\delta} \quad & \mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y, \theta) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\delta\|_p \leq \epsilon \\ & x_{\text{lb}} \preceq x + \delta \preceq x_{\text{ub}} \end{aligned}$$

Evaluating **adversarial robustness** amounts to finding adversarial examples with a given **perturbation budget (varying  $\epsilon$ )**

Robust Accuracy = accuracy under worst-case perturbation (fixed perturbation size)




# Perturbation models



# Parameters of gradient descent

What influences the **progress (and results)** of the optimization?

- **number of steps**
  - if we don't take enough steps we can stop too early and far from the optimum
- **step size**
  - if the step size is too small, we need many steps to reach convergence
  - if the step size is too big, we might overshoot the optimum
  - the decay of the step size is also important
- **function that we are optimizing**
  - there might be local minima and our optimization can get stuck in them



[https://fa.bianp.net/teaching/2018/eecs227at/gradient\\_descent.html](https://fa.bianp.net/teaching/2018/eecs227at/gradient_descent.html)




# Defending Against Evasion Attacks

- Robust training (a.k.a. Adversarial training)


$$\min_w \max_{\|\delta_i\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} \sum_i \ell(y_i, f_w(x_i + \delta_i))$$

**Pros: works!**  
**Cons: high cost**


- Detectors



**Pros: less expensive than AT!**  
**Cons: can be bypassed!**



- Ineffective defenses



Obfuscated gradients do not allow the correct execution of gradient-based attacks...

# Debugging and Improving AI/ML Security Testing




# The Rise of Adversarial Defenses





# The Rise Fall of Adversarial Defenses




# Security Evaluation of ML is Hard...

**Theoretical guarantees** of security only exist if the **data perturbation model** is somewhat mathematically tractable, and they do not scale well for large ML models

**Empirical** security testing and **adversarial defenses** need **what-if analysis** to simulate attack scenarios with *data augmentation* mechanisms. Data can be:


1. *Artificially generated*, if a perturbation model can be mathematically/algorithmically defined
2. *Collected in the wild*, e.g., to test a perception model in different operating conditions



# Security Evaluation of ML is Hard...

```
from awesome_ml_security_library import pgd


x_adv = pgd(model, x, y)
success = model.predict(x_adv) != y
```



# Ideal World vs Real World in Evaluating Adversarial Robustness


**Certified robustness:** Ensuring that no adversarial example exists within the given budget

Only doable in simple/tractable cases...



**Empirical robustness:** run empirical attacks and count their failures



But... if the attack fails, we cannot conclude that no adversarial example exists...



# Example: Gradient Obfuscation


## When GD works

Smooth function: linear approximation works





## When GD does not work

Zero gradients: impossible to find adversarial direction



Non-smooth function: linear approximation leads to local minima



# Example: Gradient Obfuscation

## When GD does not work


❌ Zero gradients: impossible to find adversarial direction



Check gradient norm



Change loss function




Check variability of loss landscape







Use smooth approximation

# Attack Failures, Indicators, and Mitigations



# Experiments









# AttackBench: Benchmarking Gradient-based Attacks

Too many new attack papers... each claiming to outperform all the others...

Tested more than 100 attack implementations, ~1,000 different configurations

**Metrics:** optimality/effectiveness and efficiency/complexity

<https://attackbench.github.io>



# Extending AI/ML Security Testing to Cybersecurity



# Practical Performance of ML-based Malware Detectors

- Let's assume we built a model robust to adversarial examples
  - but it does not seem to be much more robust over time...
  - new types of malware, different distributions unseen in training


## Open research problem

How to keep your model updated (and robust)?

Current solution: frequent model updates



- requires time and (also \$\$\$) resources

But there are other *hidden* costs...




# Inconsistencies (Regression) in Model Updates

Even if the new model is better on average, it makes *new errors* on specific samples



**Negative Flips (NFs)**



# ML Model Updates

## Continual Learning



Using only the newest data plus, eventually, a replay buffer filled with a fraction of the old data

+

## Positive Congruent Training

Regularization strategy for reducing negative flips

$$f^{\text{new}} \in \arg \min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \sum_{i=1}^n L(y_i, f(\mathbf{x}_i)) + \lambda \cdot L_{FD}(f(\mathbf{x}_i), f^{\text{old}}(\mathbf{x}_i))$$



# How About Robustness?


## Positive-Congruent Adversarial Training (PCAT)

- includes the adversarial training objective to reduce robustness negative flips
- further enhanced versions in the paper

$$\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \sum_{i=1}^n \max_{\mathbf{x}'_i \in \mathcal{B}_i} L(y_i, f(\mathbf{x}'_i)) + \lambda \cdot L_{FD}(f(\mathbf{x}'_i), f^{\text{old}}(\mathbf{x}'_i))$$


### Regression of Accuracy: Negative Flip (NF)

**Before update:** sample  $\mathbf{x}$  is classified correctly, i.e.,  $\hat{y}^{\text{old}}(\mathbf{x}) = y$






### Regression of Robustness: Robustness Negative Flip (RNF)

**Before update:** no adversarial example  $\mathbf{x}'$  is found against  $f^{\text{old}}$ , i.e.,  $\hat{y}^{\text{old}}(\mathbf{x}') = y, \forall \mathbf{x}' \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbf{x})$



# Robust Android Malware Detection Competition

- Competition on **Robust Android Malware Detection**
    - Presented at SaTML '25 <https://ramd-competition.github.io>
  - The participants had to develop solutions that are:
    - robust (possibly with guarantees) to adversarial Android malware manipulations
    - robust to data distribution changes over time
  - Solutions will be released open source
    - **Goal:** to foster *fully* reproducible robustness evaluations of ML-based Android malware detectors
- 
- 



# Concluding Remarks






# Let's fix ML Security


Problem #1: slow, hard-to-configure, limited attacks

Fix #1: improve available attacks



Problem #2: lack of debugging tools for ML Security

Fix #2: develop tests and track metrics on the attacks



Problem #3: Keep in mind the real world

Fix #3: create strong and realizable attacks

Fix #3(bis): benchmark in realistic scenarios




With LLM/LVM and GenAI the attack surface has grown even more  
Let's try not to make the same mistakes once again



# Our Vision: From MLOps to ML*Sec*Ops


- **Goal:** to empower MLOps with AI/ML Security, developing three main pillars
  - **AI/ML Protection:** to build robust AI/ML and data sanitization procedures
  - **AI/ML Security Testing:** to ensure proper testing and debugging of AI/ML models
  - **AI/ML Security Monitoring:** to monitor AI/ML models in production (e.g., when deploying MLaaS) to timely detect ongoing attacks and block them



# SecML-Torch

A Library for Robustness Evaluation of Deep Learning Models

- PyTorch-powered
- Multiple attacks implemented (and wrapped from other adv-ML libraries)
- (known bugs fixed)
- Customizable with easy-to-use OOP interfaces
- Debugging interface via TensorBoard



<https://secml-torch.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>



# Thanks!

Open Course on MLSec

<https://github.com/unica-mlsec/mlsec>

Machine Learning Security Seminars

<https://www.youtube.com/c/MLSec>

Software Tools

<https://github.com/pralab>



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